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Abstract  
Over the last decade external assessments of organizational effectiveness have 
played an increasingly pivotal role in the regulation of UK local authorities.   Unlike 
traditional approaches to evaluation, which focus on the implementation and 
outcomes of specific policies, programmes or interventions, these assessments are 
concerned primarily with internal organizational processes.   And in contrast to 
traditional forms of public services inspection, which focus on specific services, they 
seek to judge the capacity of the council as a whole.   Inspectors in England, Scotland 
and Wales have taken different approaches to assessing local authorities, but in all 
three countries their assessments have excited considerable interest among policy 
makers, achieving a much higher level of utilization than is usual for evaluative 
activities and being credited with leading to significant improvements in public service 
organizations.  But there are important questions about their impacts and doubts 
about the internal and external validity of the measures which they rely upon.    
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  1   2 Introduction 
Debates about the nature and role of evaluative activity in society have repeatedly 
returned to two key concerns: the robustness of evaluation methodologies and the 
utilization of evaluation findings.  This paper examines these twin issues in the 
context of a relatively new but increasingly influential form of performance 
monitoring – assessments of the organizational capacity of public service providers.   
It draws on research, funded by the ESRC Public Services Programme, which has 
compared and contrasted the key features, development and impact of local 
government performance inspection regimes in England, Scotland and Wales using 
evidence from policy  documents and inspection publications and interviews with 
senior policy makers and representatives of inspection bodies. 
 
The first section of the paper analyzes the increasingly important role that audit and 
inspection have played in the UK government’s approach to improving public 
services and the emergence of whole organization assessments as a key component 
of this broader reform strategy.  The second section describes the way in which 
these assessments have been adopted in local government in England, Scotland and 
Wales and examines the underlying theories of public services improvement which 
have informed their development.  The final section assesses evidence about the 
impacts of these frameworks, analyses the reasons for their apparent success in 
policy terms, and explores their validity and sustainability as a form of evaluative 
activity. 
 
 
  3 Public services inspection in the UK 
The ‘audit explosion’ (Power, 2003) is a cross-national phenomenon (Pollitt, 2003; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), but its impact has been particularly marked in the UK.  
Top down performance management first came to the fore under Conservative 
governments in the 1980s and early/mid 1990s, but it was New Labour which placed 
it at the heart of its ambitious programme of public services reform.  Unlike the 
Conservatives who lacked an explicit theory of its intended impacts (Hood et al., 
2000), the Blair government was clear about what it expected inspection to achieve.  
The strategy combined large real terms increases in public spending with a concerted 
attempt to ‘modernise’ the management of schools, hospitals, the criminal justice 
system and local government.  In a bid to ‘drive through’ change, ministers imposed 
targets for improvement backed by robust performance assessments and direct 
intervention in local service providers that failed to achieve them (PMSU, 2006).  
This strong emphasis on top down performance management led to an 
unprecedented increase in the scale, scope and intensity of external inspection of 
public services (Davis and Martin, 2008).   Hood et al. (1999) estimate that between 
1976 and 1996 spending on regulation inside government more than doubled.  But 
this increase was dwarfed by the spiralling costs of under New Labour.  The bill for 
inspection of public services in England for example more than doubled from £250 
million to £550 million in just six years (OPSR, 2003) between 1997 and 2003.  The 
running costs of the Office for Standards in Education and the Social Services 
Inspectorate each increased by 100 per cent, and the costs of the Audit 
Commission’s inspection activities increased more than tenfold, whilst its workforce 
grew by almost 90 per cent.  In addition to expanding the role of these existing 
inspectorates, ministers created a host of new inspection agencies including the 
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Inspectorate of Court Administration; the Care Standards Commission; the 
Commission for Health Improvement; National Patient Safety Agency; and National 
Clinical Assessment Authority.  The growth in inspection has not been an exclusively 
English affair.  The Crerar review of scrutiny arrangements in Scotland (Crerar, 
2007) found that eleven entirely new inspection bodies had been created since 1999 
and (as in England) existing inspectorates had seen their scrutiny functions expanded. 
 
This unprecedented increase in inspection activity was accompanied by a 
fundamental shift in Government thinking about its role in the management of public 
services.  Traditionally, inspection has been seen as a form of quality assurance, 
designed to alert the public and politicians to instances where services were failing to 
meet minimum standards (Grace, 2005).  This was undertaken by experts who had 
usually worked in the services that they were scrutinizing and used criteria which 
had generally been agreed by the relevant professional bodies.  Under New Labour 
however, inspection was portrayed primarily as an ‘agent of improvement’, rather 
than a mechanism for quality assurance.  Hospitals, schools, the police and local 
authorities were no longer required simply to meet minimum standards.  In return 
for the substantial new investment which they received, they were now expected to 
achieve continuous improvement.  It was no longer acceptable simply to comply with 
minimum standards, public service organizations now had to be able to demonstrate 
that they were getting better all the time (Grace and Martin, 2008).  To assist them 
to do so improvement agencies were to assist health trusts, the police and local 
government on their improvement journeys.  English local authorities were for 
example supported by a range of programmes run by an Improvement and 
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Scottish Improvement Service.  In the health service, the NHS Modernisation Agency 
operated in England for a time and the NHS Quality Improvement Scotland 
(NHSQIS)) fulfilled a similar role.     
 
One of the most explicit statements of this reform strategy was heralded by the 
1999 Local Government Act which imposed a new statutory duty on a range of ‘best 
value authorities’ (including local councils, the police, national parks and fire 
authorities) to ‘make arrangements to secure continuous improvement in the way 
functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness’ (The Stationery Office 1999, clause 3.1).  In order to enforce this 
legislation, the inspectorates were asked to assess whether service providers would 
achieve improvement in the future.  This took them into uncharted waters.  They 
were now required to make complex and multi-faceted judgements about a range of 
different dimension of performance.  And the stakes were much higher than ever 
before as secretaries of state took extensive powers to intervene in services which 
inspectors judged to be failing.  As a result inspection became a far more potent 
force for change.  Reports could make or break an organisation’s reputation and 
with it the careers of its senior managers.  For this reason it also became a more 
public and sometimes contentious affair.  The inspectorates therefore needed to be 
able to defend their judgements should an inspected body decide to challenge them 
through a judicial review.  They no longer felt able to rely on the judgement of 
expert professionals who ‘knew a good service when they saw one’.  They needed to 
specify the attributes which they believed determined an organization’s capacity to 
improve.  The result was a set of criteria - mainly associated with internal 
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priorities; ambitious targets for improvement - which inspectors believed to be 
hallmarks of well run organisations which had the capacity to improve in future.   
 
This form of external assessment represents a new and distinctive form of regulation 
inside government.  It differs from traditional approaches to evaluation because it 
focuses on organizational attributes rather than the impacts of policies, programmes 
or interventions.  And it is distinguished from previous approaches to public services 
inspection by a number of important features.  First, whole organization assessments 
take a more holistic approach.  They cut across established professional boundaries 
and service ‘silos’, thus weakening the link between professions and inspection.     
Second, they are prospective as well as retrospective, seeking to assess prospects 
for future improvement in addition to reporting on past performance.  Third, they 
are expected to play a direct role in encouraging improvement.  Finally, in England 
(though not in Scotland and Wales) they are associated with the promise tangible 
rewards for good performers (in the form of greater autonomy from government 
control) and the threat of sanctions for poor performers (in the form of tighter top 
down regulation of their activities). 
  
Whole Organization Assessments in Local Government 
The whole organization assessments that have been developed in England, Scotland 
and Wales are not identical, but they share some core characteristics.  They all focus 
on a local authority’s capacity to fulfil its statutory duty to secure continuous 
improvement, and they all emphasise the importance of the leadership of the 
organization as a whole, rather than the performance of individual services.  This 
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local council services in the late 1990s.  Inspectors and civil servants sent in to tackle 
poor performance rapidly came to the conclusion that the problems went well much 
deeper than they had originally suspected and were associated with weaknesses well 
beyond the particular services which they were mandated to deal with.  As a result 
they came to the view that ‘serious and sustained service failure is also a failure of 
corporate leadership’ (Audit Commission, 2002: 19).  Inspection of individual 
services, within these whole organisation assessments was therefore of limited value 
because ‘Without clear corporate leadership for change it becomes a very negative 
task based process’ (Audit Commission, 2001: 14).    
 
Comprehensive Performance Assessments (CPAs), which were introduced in English 
local government in 2002, reflected this philosophy.  Results were published annually 
for all 150 unitary and county councils and on a less frequent basis for district 
councils.  The CPA methodology scored a council’s performance in main seven areas 
(environment, housing, culture, fire and rescue, services to children, social care and 
benefits administration) for upper tier and unitary authorities, and four service 
blocks in the case of districts (housing, environment, culture and benefits 
administration).  These scores were weighted and then aggregated to provide an 
overall ‘performance’ score which was combined with an assessment of the council’s 
corporate capacity to provide an overall rating.  Councils were categorised as ‘poor’, 
‘weak’, ‘fair’, ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ and these assessments were published in a form 
which facilitated ease of comparison between authorities.  Over time the 
methodology was refined to provide what the Audit Commission called a ‘harder 
test’.  Assessments of the main service blocks remained largely unchanged, but the 
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an authority’s partnerships, its effectiveness as a community leader and the way it 
used financial resources.  The 2006 CPA also introduced an assessment of a council’s 
overall ‘direction of travel’.   
 
In April 2009 CPAs were superseded by ‘Comprehensive Area Assessments’ (CAAs) 
which monitor all of the main public service outcomes in a locality rather than 
focusing exclusively on the services for which councils are directly responsible.   
CAAs pay particular attention to priorities set out in local area agreements made 
between central government departments and the key public service providers in 
each area.   Because success in achieving these outcomes depends on the 
performance of a wide range of agencies (such as police, probation and health 
services), CAAs bring together the judgements of a total of seven different 
inspectorates – the Audit Commission, Commission for Social Care Inspection; 
Healthcare Commission;  HM Inspectorate of Constabulary;  HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons; HM Inspectorate of Probation; and the Office for Standards in Education, 
Children's Services and Skills.  Like CPAs, they involve annual analysis of 
performance (in meeting the targets set out in local area agreements) and the 
prospects of future improvement.   
 
Local authorities in Scotland have been subject to whole organization assessments, 
known as Best Value Audits (BVAs), since 2003/2004.  Like CPAs, these provide an 
overall assessment of a council’s current performance and its corporate capacity 
(including the effectiveness of its political leadership, internal scrutiny arrangements 
and corporate management team).  However, unlike CPAs, they take heed of local 
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to area.  Inspectors can not therefore adopt a ‘one size fits all’ approach.  Because of 
this, unlike CPAs, BVAs are not rules-based.  Councils are required to demonstrate 
how they are achieving continuous improvement and Best Value Audit teams provide 
a narrative report on strengths and areas for improvement.  Audits are descriptive 
rather than prescriptive, and the reports on different authorities are not strictly 
comparable.  BVAs do not therefore produce an overall score and there are no 
league tables of overall capacity and performance.  BVAs are undertaken on a three 
year cycle.  Following publication of a report, a council is required to produce a 
detailed improvement plan explaining how it proposes to address issues which have 
been identified as needing attention. The council’s local external auditor then 
monitors implementation of the plan.  Audit Scotland reports to the Accounts 
Commission on progress against the improvement plan and if it finds that insufficient 
action is being taken, it can hold a hearing or recommend action to Ministers in 
specific areas of concern.   By December 2008, 26 out of the 32 councils had 
completed the process and all 32 councils will have a received a BVA report by 
Spring 2009.   
 
The next round of BVAs (BV2) will begin in 2009/10.  The indications are that BV2 
audits will be more proportionate, based on joint risk assessment and joint planning 
with other scrutiny bodies.  They are also likely to make greater use of self-
assessments by the audited bodies.  Graded performance judgements may be 
introduced and, as with CAAs,  there is likely to be more focus on partnerships and 
performance outcomes.  With the intention of providing a more integrated approach 
to scrutiny, BV2s are to provide an overarching corporate assessment framework, 
  10 which dovetail with jointly planned service inspections.  However, the framework for 
BV2 will continue to reflect a strong emphasis on corporate capacity and leadership 
in line with Audit Scotland’s theory of improvement which states that: ‘Effective 
leadership, good governance and sound management are necessary conditions for 
the delivery of sustainable continuous improvement and effective outcomes’  (Audit 
Scotland, 2008 p 2). 
 
The Wales Programme for Improvement (WPI) represents a third variant of whole 
organization assessments.  Like CPAs, the statutory basis of the WPI lay in the duty 
to achieve continuous improvement introduced by the 1999 Local Government Act.  
And, as with CPAs, of unitary and upper tier authorities, WPI involves annual 
assessments of councils.  In common with the BVA framework, it explicitly 
recognizes that needs and priorities will vary between localities and assessments can 
not be used to compare authorities’ performance with each other.  As in Scotland, 
there are also therefore no published league tables of overall performance.   Initially 
each authority was required to complete an assessment of its overall capacity to 
achieve continuous improvement and to identify its strengths and weaknesses.  The 
Wales Audit Office (WAO) then conducted its own assessment before agreeing with 
the authority a joint risk assessment which specifies the areas that will need to be 
addressed in order to secure improvement.  This document formed the basis of a 
bespoke improvement and regulatory plan which is tailored to each council’s 
priorities and ‘improvement journey’ and updated regularly.  The WAO publishes an 
annual report on the overall progress being made by Welsh authorities, but unlike 
CPA and BVA reports, individual risk assessments are currently subject to bi-lateral 
confidentiality agreements between the auditors and individual authorities which 
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councils are considered to be at risk of underperforming.  
 
Like CPAs, the Wales Programme for Improvement has evolved over time.  Revised 
government guidance, issued in 2005 removed the statutory requirement to conduct 
annual assessments of their overall performance and capacity.   It also strengthened 
the definition of ‘risk’ by emphasising that this included failure to improve services, as 
well as more traditional concerns such as a breakdown in delivery processes or 
financial losses (WAG, 2005).  In 2008 the Assembly Government published a 
measure which proposed new powers for ministers to set national performance 
standards and intervene in authorities which are seen as being at risk of failing to 
improve.  It also proposed that authorities should have to publish annual 
performance information and the Auditor General should be required to publish 
annual improvement reports for each authority.  If approved, these provisions will 
therefore make the WPI a much more open process, bringing it more into line with 
practice in England and Scotland. 
 
There are then some significant differences between the frameworks which have 
been developed in English, Scottish and Welsh local government.  CPAs were 
imposed ‘top down’ on local authorities with relatively little discussion or 
consultation.  The Audit Commission determined the weightings that would be 
attached to different services, and developed a ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
inspection which focused on national policy imperatives rather than local priorities.  
As a result CPA reports could be used to rank and compare authorities’ 
performance.  By contrast both the WPI and BVAs were developed through a much 
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prominent role.  Both frameworks are attuned to local contexts.  They allow 
authorities to set their own priorities and to be judged in terms of whether they are 
achieving what they have set out to.  However, the differences are not simply 
between the UK government’s approach to public services reform in England on the 
one hand and that of the devolved administrations on the other.  BVAs share some 
important characteristics with CPAs.  For example, the English and Scottish 
frameworks both rely primarily on external assessments of performance, whereas 
the WPI places authorities’ own self assessments on a par with those of the external 
inspectors.  Like CPAs, BVA reports are published, whereas WPI risk assessments 
remained confidential.  And England and Scotland both adopted formal protocols 
which specified the grounds on which central government might intervene directly in 
the running of local authority services, whereas Welsh ministers took a ‘softly, softly’ 
approach with intervention conducted on ad hoc basis, behind the scenes and by 
agreement with the Welsh Local Government Association.   
 
These contrasts between the three frameworks reflect differences in central-local 
relations in the three countries and the size and nature of their policy communities.  
What Hood (2006) calls ‘English exceptionalism’ - the imposition of top down 
targets, performance monitoring and league tables - reflects the view among many 
Whitehall departments that local authorities are delivery agents of national policies.  
There is an assumption that central government needs to set national standards and 
has a duty to intervene directly where local service providers fail to achieve them.  
CPAs were therefore designed to provide assurance that services were improving 
and to identify those authorities which required intervention.  The theory was that 
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proportion to their success.  Excellent local councils, hospitals, schools, and police 
forces should, it is argued, be subject to relatively ‘light touch’ inspection.  But poor 
performers need robust, external challenge and scrutiny in order to raise self 
awareness and overcome any lingering complacency about underperformance 
(Barber, 2007).   
 
Policy makers in Scotland and Wales reject this muscular centralism because there is 
a very different relationship between central government departments, audit bodies 
and local councils in the much small and relatively close knit policy communities in 
these two countries.  In Scotland, the Accounts Commission and Audit Scotland are 
influential bodies which, by and large, have enjoyed good working relationships with 
both central and local government.  As a result, ‘policies in relation to the institution 
of local government have generally been supportive and sensitive to the democratic 
mandate of councils in principle’ (Gallagher et al., 2007: 22), and oversight 
mechanisms have been developed through ‘a consultative style based on convention 
and consensus, not codification, as in England’ (Midwinter and McGarvey, 2001: 842).  
Wales has a much stronger localist tradition than England.  Government policy 
statements emphasise local government’s independent democratic mandate and the 
local government lobby has been more cohesive than its counterpart in Scotland.  
Local authorities have therefore been able to exercise considerable influence (Laffin, 
2004).  The devolution settlement placed a statutory duty on the National Assembly 
for Wales to work in partnership with local councils and the limited capacity of the 
new devolved administration has meant that civil servants have depended on local 
government for policy input (Jeffery, 2006).  The strength of this central-local axis 
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Scotland. 
 
Conclusion: Impacts and Implications 
Whole authority assessments are interesting from both a policy and research 
perspective.  The UK has gone further and faster in developing improvement 
frameworks of this kind and may therefore offer useful insights for policy makers in 
other countries.  Moreover, the existence of three different variants in England, 
Scotland and Wales provides a unique ‘laboratory’ in which the advantages and 
disadvantages of different approaches can be monitored and tested.  Understanding 
how and why they have become such an indispensable part of the UK government’s 
public services reform strategy is important because of what it may indicate about 
the nature of the interaction between policy making and evaluation.   
 
In contrast to some other forms of evaluation, whole authority assessments pass the 
utilization test with flying colours. They have proved extraordinarily successful in 
grabbing the attention of politicians and policy makers and are credited with having 
helped to produce significant improvement in local government performance.   
Supporters of whole authority assessments can point to year-on-year improvements 
in CPA scores from 2002 onwards as evidence of their success.  By 2004 67% of 
authorities were rated as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’, compared to only 51% in 2002.  By 
2006, when judged against the more exacting criteria of the CPA ‘harder test’, four 
out of five authorities were placed in the top two performance categories and for 
the first time there were none were judged to be in the lowest category (Audit 
Commission, 2007).   It would be surprising, if some of this improvement was not 
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the inspectors’ template of a ‘well managed’ organization.  The rules were made 
explicit and they were easy to follow.  It was clear which services mattered most and 
it as fairly straightforward matter to put in place the kinds of managerial systems 
which inspectors were looking for.  In these circumstances most authorities were 
therefore able to present themselves in a more favourable light over time.  But there 
is evidence that there was more to the improvements in CPA scores than crafty 
stage management by local government or complicity by inspectors.  A large-scale 
survey of senior local authority officers found that a very significant majority believed 
CPAs to be the most significant external driver of the performance of their councils, 
and a similar survey of chief executives found that most of them regarded CPAs as a 
much more effective means of supporting improvement in their councils than service 
based inspections (Downe and Martin, 2006).  Longitudinal case study research also 
suggests that CPAs have played an important role in focusing councils’ attention on 
the need for improvement (Martin, 2008).   
 
A similar picture of reported impact is also found in Scotland and Wales.  Downe et 
al. (2008) found that nearly all Scottish councils believed that BVAs had led to 
improvements in their corporate processes, and an independent review of the 
regulation of public services in Scotland (Crerar, 2007) praised the BVA 
methodology and recommended that it be adopted in other parts of the public 
sector.  In Wales, the WPI has also been credited with producing improvements in 
business and planning assessment processes and in particular better performance 
management and more reliable risk assessments (WAO, 2007), although the lack of 
published reports makes it difficult to verify this.   
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The contrast between the perceived ‘usefulness’ of whole authority assessments and 
apparent non-utilisation of some other forms of evaluation is striking and it is worth 
exploring some of the possible reasons for this.  One possible explanation is that  
frameworks such CPAs, BVAs and the WPI are underpinned by simple theories of 
change which offer local authorities relatively uncomplicated formulae for 
improvement.  Another key to their success has been that they yield what policy 
makers like to refer to as ‘real time data’ which provides central government (in 
England and Scotland) with a means of differentiating between good and poor 
performers and therefore of determining which councils require additional support 
or intervention and which can be safely left more or less to their own devices.  It is 
argued that star ratings and aggregate measures (such as those which were provided 
by CPAs) are ‘easily understood by the public, a simple test is immediately clear and 
there is no need to weigh up the effect of a large number of different indicators’ 
(CHI, 2004: 3).   
 
A third explanation for the high level of utilisation and perceived impact of whole 
authority assessments stems from the statutory basis of these assessments and the 
associated consequences in terms of ministerial intervention in the event of a 
damning assessment.  This both reflects and has enhanced the institutional standing 
and powerful connections of the audit bodies that have been responsible for devising 
and implementing CPAs and BVAs.  The potential reputational damage and fall out in 
terms of the careers of senior managers in local government have given the 
watchdogs ‘real teeth’. 
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government and attracting an unprecedented level of attention within the local 
community, whole authority have their detractors.  There four principal concerns. 
First, there have been persistent worries that the assessments are too burdensome.  
Second, a number of commentators have argued that they are methodologically 
flawed.  Third, they have manifestly failed in their aspiration to attract public interest 
and involvement.  Fourth, there are doubts about whether the methodology can be 
translated from focus on the competence of individual organisations which was 
provided by CPAs and BVAs to the evaluation of area based outcomes which CAAs 
and BV2 purport to offer. 
 
In England, some ex-inspectors question the value of repeating CPAs each year.   
They argue that the first iteration of whole authority assessments identified the 
glaring gaps and easy wins. Once this ‘low hanging fruit’ had been harvested there 
were diminishing marginal returns to be gained from each subsequent round.  Partly 
for this reason, many local authority officers who accept that CPAs have helped to 
improve their council’s systems and practices nevertheless question whether the 
gains justify the on-going financial and opportunity costs associated with the process 
(Downe and Martin, 2007).  The UK government has responded to these concerns 
by seeking to streamline inspection processes through mergers of inspectorates and 
more recently a new performance framework for English local government which 
promises a ‘lighter touch’ approach.  Scotland and Wales have made similar attempts 
to reduce the numbers of inspectorates and introduce more ‘proportionate’ 
inspection frameworks.   In Scotland, the Crerar review of scrutiny arrangements 
(Crerar, 2007) even went as far as to suggest that a more coherent and 
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national scrutiny body.  Although this unlikely to happen, it is probable that some 
inspectorates will be merged and those which remain will have to work more closely 
with each other.   Similar proposals to encourage closer working between the main 
inspectorates in Wales, which between them cover education, social care, local 
government and health, were announced in a recent Government policy statement 
(Welsh Assembly Government, 2008). 
 
There are also fundamental concerns about the methodologies used to generate 
whole authority assessments.  In particular critics have questioned the basis on 
which aggregate measures such as CPA scores are calculated, arguing that they are 
overly simplistic and potentially misleading.  They suggest that whole authority 
assessments mask the multi-faceted nature of performance (Cutler and Waine, 
2003); that scoring systems are highly sensitive to the weightings attached to services 
(Jacobs and Goddard, 2007); and CPAs failed to take sufficient account of factors 
(such deprivation levels and the degree of ethnic fractionalization in a local 
population) which lie beyond the control of local councils but are known to exert a 
strong influence on public service outcomes such as educational attainment and 
community safety (Andrews, 2004; McLean et al. 2007).   There are also significant 
concerns about the basis on which prospects for improvement are assessed.   
Privately, many inspectors admit that judgements about prospects for improvement 
are subjective.  And some local government practitioners question whether 
improvements in their organisations’ corporate capacity - the quality of performance 
management systems and the perceived effectiveness of the organization’s leadership 
and so forth – are necessarily associated with better service outcomes.  It is 
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corporate processes and systems but that services were left unaffected, a risk that 
was illustrated graphically by the much publicised failure of Haringey Council, rated 
as a three star (or ‘good’) authority by inspectors in its 2007 CPA, to prevent the 
death of ‘Baby P’.  Conversely, there are examples of local authorities (for example 
Inverclyde in Scotland) that are performing well in terms of service delivery but were 
slammed by inspectors for their perceived lack of corporate capacity. 
 
A third criticism of whole authority assessments is that, whilst they have engaged the 
interest of policy makers and local government practitioners, they have largely 
passed the public by.  The rationale for the introduction of ‘Michelin’ style scoring 
systems which summed up the results of CPAs was that this would make inspection 
results accessible to citizens.  But there is very little evidence that it has achieved 
this.   While school league tables have enhanced parental choice and been widely 
used in recent years (Wilson, 2004), there is little evidence of high levels of public 
awareness of or interest in other metrics, including CPA results and BVA reports.  
Moreover, some argue that to the extent that the public do take any notice of 
‘naming and shaming’ of poor performers, this corrodes rather than enhances 
confidence in public services (O’Neill, 2002).   Equally, a damning corporate 
assessment can damage staff morale and become a self fulfilling prophecy as 
authorities that have been stigmatised by inspectors struggle to retain staff and 
attract new recruits. 
 
These methodological and pragmatic objections to whole authority assessments raise 
important questions about the adequacy of the managerial model which underpins 
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the importance of understanding the complex and contested nature of the concept 
of ‘improvement’ from which whole organization assessments derive both their legal 
authority and their moral purpose.  Clearly, as suggested above, there is an 
important difference between improvement in processes and improvement in 
services outcomes, and one is not necessarily linked to the other in any 
straightforward way.  Moreover, the kinds of improvements which are most prized 
will vary over time and differ between localities.  It is self evident that the effective 
delivery of public services in remote rural areas presents very different challenges to 
those confronted in inner city areas with large, ethnically diverse populations.   
Similarly, whereas the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s were 
primarily concerned with improving the efficiency of public services, in the early 
years of the Blair government the emphasis was firmly on improving the quality of 
services.  In the changed economic conditions which prevail ten years later increasing 
efficiency may well come to the fore once again.   
 
This raises important questions about the ability of whole organization assessment to 
adapt to changing conditions and requirements.  Many of the reforms of the last 
decade have been concerned with improving existing services (i.e. doing the same 
things better).  Whole authority assessments such as CPA, BVAs and the WPI, with 
their emphasis on achieving basic levels of competence through the application of 
performance management systems, are well suited to this endeavour.  But if the 
emphasis shifts away from competence and towards innovation (doing new things 
and/or doing things differently), as it might well at a time when resources are tight, 
these frameworks may seem less useful.  Moreover, there are important questions 
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complex ‘cross cutting’ issues (such as obesity and antisocial behaviour) which 
require concerted action by a range of agencies.  These priorities inevitably take the 
issue of ‘improvement’ well beyond questions of managerial competence and the 
resolution of technical challenges into new realms requiring more complex and 
nuanced definitions of performance improvement and the exercise of difficult 
political judgements between competing priorities and interest groups.  The 
increased emphasis on the importance of partnership working among local service 
providers to tackle these kinds of problems implies that inspection frameworks will 
in future need to be able to assess inter-organizational (rather than organizational) 
effectiveness.  There is no doubt that central government would welcome metrics 
which evaluate public service outcomes in this holistic way.  After a decade of 
unprecedented growth in inspection and a certain kind of success, the challenge now 
facing public service inspectorates is therefore to devise methodologies which 
provide a valid basis for making judgements of this kind.  Whether, given the doubts 
about the validity of existing organization assessment frameworks, they will be able 
to pull off this even more ambitious project, remains to be seen.  
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